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Abstract 
With increasing globalisation of knowledge, there are increased opportunities to 'learn' from the experience of 
policy interventions elsewhere. This paper presents evidence on the extent of international convergence in 
public policy, with particular focus on labour, welfare, savings and retirement policy. Questions addressed in 
this framework include: to what extent is policy diffusion or convergence a real and relevant phenomenon? 
What role have economists played in the transfer of policy across national domains? Has policy transfer led to 
'better' public policy? Are there any practical limitations to policy convergence? 
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1  Introduction 
Over the last  two decades, government have taken an increasingly proactive approach  to welfare 
policy.  In an age of globalisation, governments anxious to reform welfare policy have increasingly 
sought  to learn  from international experience.   This paper looks at  the extent to which  welfare 
reform has been driven by  public policy ideas  that  have  been  disseminated across national 
boundaries, a process  that  has been termed ‘policy transfer’.   Specifically, the paper examines the 
development and adaptation of  three closely related domains of public policy  in several OECD 
countries – labour market policies, employment conditional payments ('making work pay' policies), 
and policies to  delay retirement and to  promote  retirement saving.  In doing so, the paper 
differentiates between  types of policy transfer that have been identified in the political science 
literature, and suggests that different processes are at work in the  three dimensions of public policy 
that we consider. We show that bringing the economist’s evaluative capacities to bear on the issue of 
policy transfer enhances our understanding of the concept. 
How has the increased globalisation of economic activity provided greater opportunities to 'learn' 
from experience with interventions elsewhere?  There are a  number of factors that have facilitated  
policy transfer.  First, globalisation and technological development allow policy ideas and initiatives 
to be easily communicated in the international arena (Stone, 2000).  Second, the growth in 
regionalism among nation states and the development of regional identities in the last decade or so 
of the twentieth century has stimulated more active dialogue on c omparative policy.  Third, many 
OECD governments claim to pursue programmes of 'evidence based' policy.  Fourth, international 
agencies like the IMF, OECD, the World Bank and the WTO actively facilitate policy transfer. 
The spectrum of policy domains across which policy transfer seems to be occurring is a broad one 
and it is not the purpose of this paper to provide an exhaustive survey.  Rather, our paper sets out a 
simple organising framework for thinking about policy transfer and then focuses on specific policy 
domains. We begin in Section 2 by defining and setting out conceptual issues arising from policy 
transfer.  The core of the paper then examines policy transfer in the context of welfare and labour 
market interventions in OECD countries, and in particular in the United Kingdom.  Section 3 
considers policies designed to reduce unemployment.  Section 4 concentrates on specific welfare 
policy measures designed to ‘make work pay’ (OECD, 1997), with particular focus on the evolution 
of tax credits in the US, the UK and a number of other  OECD countries. Section 5 considers 
policies designed to encourage retirement saving and to maintain public pension programmes.  
Finally, Section 6 concludes with some lessons that may be drawn from a comparison of these three 
case studies.    4 
2  Policy Transfer: some issues 
2.1  Policy transfer defined 
“Policy transfer” is a well-established concept in the political science literature.  According to 
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), it is a process whereby "… knowledge about policies' administrative 
arrangements and ideas in one political setting is used in the development of policies' administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in another setting." (p.5)   Much of this political science 
literature  has focused on institutional mechanisms and on the process of policy transfer.
1  Although 
this is a large literature, and is therefore hard to summarise succinctly, it contains  some features that 
are familiar to economists; some less so.  Typically the literature is taxonomic, classifying policies by 
the extent of the transfer (how do we know whether a policy is ‘transferred’ or indigenous?) or by 
the nature of the transfer (a continuum from ‘rational’ – which is close to a ‘best practice’ argument 
– through to ‘coercive’ – with IMF-based policy typically highlighted as an example of the latter).  It 
is also heavily case study oriented, lending weight to critics that question the selective nature of the 
evidence on successful policy transfer.  This has led some advocates of the policy transfer approach 
to policy analysis to seek examples of transplanted policies that appear not to work (Dolowitz, 2001).  
An important link with the economics discipline arises from the public c hoice view of policy 
formulation, which views a given set of policies as the outcome of a process of interaction between 
competing interest groups.   By analysing the sources of political support for the policy transfer, it is 
argued, analysts can  derive a prediction as to who are the ‘gainers’ and ‘losers’ from the process.  
Indeed, in such circumstances the economic interests of those with ‘swing’ political power may 
determine the policy outcome (Saint-Paul 2000, 2002). 
What can economists add to this analysis of policy transfer?   First, and most importantly, they can 
provide methods of policy evaluation.  Without an evidence base, and methods to analyse evidence, 
it is impossible to judge the outcome of a policy intervention and hence its suitability for use in 
another context or region.  In the absence of ‘evidence-based policy’, it is impossible to ‘read off’ 
from the nature of the policy transfer mechanism or from its political constituency whether a given 
policy does in fact enhance welfare overall, or that of a specific group.  Second, economists can 
contribute towards the formal theory of policy determination (see  later).  Finally, economists can 
combine the theory of policy determination with empirical evidence to assess the quality of these 
theories, although such studies are rare.
2   
                                                   
1 See, inter alia, Davies et al (2000), Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000), Evans and Davies (1999), Hill (1996), Jacobs and 
Barnett (2000), James and Lodge (2003), Stone (1999), Walker (1999), Walker and Wiseman (2003), Wolman (1992).   
2 Acemoglu et al (2001) or Saint-Paul (1996) represent two contributions to this literature.   5 
2.2  Motives for policy transfer   
An alternative approach to the public choice framework has seen policy transfer as a process 
whereby governments  adopt what they see as best practice, or better practice, by reference to 
experience with those policies elsewhere.  In this sense there is a parallel with the literature on 
technological diffusion over time, by which innovations spread geographically and across industries 
as firms gradually learn about the new technology and its advantages – indeed the political science 
literature sometimes uses the term ‘social diffusion’ when describing ‘rational’ policy transfer (Berry 
and Berry, 1999).  This suggests  that in the long run, well-functioning countries should converge to 
the “frontier” policies in a similar way to the long-run convergence of income per capita among 
countries (at least within a ‘convergence club’ such as the group of OECD countries).   
An essentially technocratic approach to policy transfer, perhaps reflecting a growing convergence of 
the international political debate, underlies the idea of  ‘rational’ policy in the political science 
literature, but this is not the only type of policy transfer identified in that literature ( as indicated  
above). Unfortunately, there is no obvious selection mechanism that roots out poor practice and 
rewards best practice analogous to the operation of the  economic marketplace. It would take an 
absurdly  optimistic view of the democratic process to believe that this was a mechanism 
systematically rewarding the pursuit of best practice policies. Rather it manages to remove after 
some period of time some of the very worst policies which impoverish large parts of the electorate 
(at least in comparison to dictatorship).  One utilitarian tradition follows  James Mill’s view of 
electoral democracy as a machine for periodically removing the worst gangs of plunderers of the 
state coffers.  
 Diamond (1998) suggests mi litary strength as another selection mechanism: c ountries pursuing very 
poor policies become vulnerable to hostile takeovers by more economically successful nation states. 
Unfortunately, the richer country may choose merely to expropriate the poorer nation of its wealth 
rather than export its better practices (Acemoglu  et al, 2001). So while such selection mechanisms 
may exist, they are extremely weak and unlikely to generate convergence. 
A third alternative scenario to the ‘best practice’ framework is where policy transfer is driven by fad 
or bandwagon effects  – herding behaviour is a common phenomenon in many environments from 
stock markets to the fashion industry (e.g Banerjee, 1992). A possibility in these alternative scenarios 
is that ‘bad’ policies, in the evaluative sense, are sometimes transferred.  A specific possibility of this 
occurs where there is public pressure to introduce a reform quickly and an ‘off-the-shelf’ policy 
from elsewhere is adopted.
3  In similar vein, there may be many reasons why apparently successful 
                                                   
3  See Dolowitz (2001) again on the Child Support Agency.  A limitation of the political science approach would seem to 
be that a ‘bad’ policy is judged solely by the response of interest groups to the policy.  In contrast, an economic   6 
policies in one national context are not transferred. This may simply be that they are ‘inappropriate’ 
in another context (i.e. not best practice), or because alternative coalitions of interest groups block 
such transfers  as in the public choice model, or through sheer historical accident.  But it may also be 
that the outcome from policy is either hard to evaluate, or else simply poorly evaluated.  This 
strengthens the case for appropriate evaluation techniques, since it is likely that particular interest 
groups would find it easier to re-negotiate what constitutes ‘best practice’ in the absence of rigorous 
evaluations. 
2.3  Policy convergence? 
Much of the political science literature on policy transfer and convergence is concerned directly with 
the process by which policy ideas are communicated or adapted across national domains. The 
literature is less clear as to whether the transfer of similar policy ideas can achieve similar policy 
objectives, if indeed this is the primary motivation for the policy transfer.  Arguably, policy 
objectives are converging more than the policy instruments themselves.  Two dimensions of public 
policy serve to illustrate the point. 
It is common to frame welfare policy debates in terms of three overriding objectives – i) tackling 
child poverty; ii) supporting low incomes, and iii) promoting employment or increasing human 
capital. In targeting these ‘three pillars’ of welfare reform, many governments around the world have 
apparently adopted similar policy approaches, taking the view that a combination of active labour 
market policies, simplification in welfare payments, tight eligibility conditions and some form of 
employment-contingent payment is sufficient to deliver the required outcomes. Here is a policy 
domain in which increasing similarity of policy objectives have given rise to a convergence in the 
structure and balance of policy instruments.  
But this is by no means the only pattern of evolution for public policy.  A useful contrast is provided 
when one explores the development of savings and retirement policies. Although public policies are 
again motivated by common objectives across national domains (for example, in the face of ageing, 
to maintain the living standards of current and future pensioners while keeping public expenditures 
under control), there appears to be much less  agreement on the types of policies most suited to 
deliver on those objectives. We discuss this lack of agreement, and offer some possible explanations, 
in Section 5 below. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
evaluation of the policy might suggest a different set of criteria: for example do alternative child support policies affect 
the probability of dissolution of partnerships where children are involved? – see Walker and Zhu (2004). 
   7 
A similar issue arises from the distinction between specific policy transfers and generic policy 
‘models’.  An illustration of the former is provided in Section 4, describing the evolution of tax 
credits in the US, the UK and elsewhere.  Two examples of more generic policy models derive from 
the mid-1990s.  One concerns the influence of the OECD-based ‘Jobs Study’ (1994, 1995) on 
welfare policies designed to ‘make work pay’ by the variety of measures described above. The next 
section describes the Job Study recommendations more fully. A second illustration of a generic 
reform model (although still criticised by many for its specificity) was the World Bank’s (1994) 
attempt to derive a multi-pillar model of pension delivery that was sufficiently flexible to encompass 
much of the variety of actual pension regimes in the world whilst at the same time steering those 
regimes towards particular objectives and design features.   Such encompassing policy frameworks 
suffer from the intrinsic difficulty of balancing flexibility and adaptability in different institutional 
settings against frameworks that are so general as to permit nation states (or indeed particular interest 
groups within those states) to avoid making any real choices.    
3  The Diffusion of Unemployment Policies 
Dealing with the causes and consequences of rising unemployment levels in the 1980s and 1990s 
posed major policy challenges  to many OECD  countries.  Dissatisfaction with the efficacy of 
narrowly defined policies of demand management and monetary control led to greater interest in 
examining the  impact of supply side constraints, especially in the labour market, on economic 
performance.  International organisations ( including  the  OECD,  the  IMF and the  European 
Commission) actively promoted the necessity of reform to labour market institutions (especially in 
dealing with the persistence of unemployment in large Continental European nations).  Much of the 
empirical evidence underlying these recommendations  is controversial and derives from cross 
country panel data studies with questionable indicators for  ‘institutions’.
4  The more compelling 
evidence uses micro data which suggests that some policies, such as job 
assistance/monitoring/sanctions to enforce search, are more effective than others, such as 
government training. 
The OECD Jobs Study (1994, 1995) is a good example of an explicit attempt to  transfer policy from 
a perceived   ‘policy leader’ (the  relatively deregulated  US) to  its followers. T he broad 
recommendation s of the Jobs Study favoured reforming the unemployment benefit system (through 
                                                   
4  Layard, Nickell  and Jackman (1991) look at how the level of unemployment correlates with measures of country-
specific institutions.  Blanchard and W olfers (2000) look at the way unemployment has changed in response to the 
interaction between levels of institutions and shocks. Nickell (2003) looks at how the changes of unemployment can be 
accounted for by changes in institutions. The empirical consensus on the impact of institutions has been challenged by 
some, such as Baker et al  (2004).  The national indicators utilised in such studies have also been questioned and 
reformulated (see, for example, Disney, 2000a and 2004).   8 
lower replacement rates, shorter durations, and stricter administration of work search), weaker 
employment protection, lowering marginal and average tax rates, and  reforms to collective 
bargaining to allow wages to reflect more closely local demand. The degree to which countries have 
followed OECD recommendations is  considered  in  several  follow up reports that monitored 
performance (e.g.  OECD, 1997, 1999). The accompanying analyses argue that those who adopted 
the OECD’s recommendations had better unemployment outcomes
5.   
Arguably this monitoring put political pressure on slow reforming countries to change.  OECD 
(1999, pp.182-183) presents a scorecard for all OECD countries of how many of its original Job 
Study recommendations have been followed up, ignored or actually gone into reverse (Germany had 
the most labour market recommendations – 23 and the US the joint least – 4). Overall a picture of 
some convergence i s presented.  Across all the OECD nations  160 of  the original  264 
recommendations had some action  and only 16 ‘opposite actions’ had taken place. In addition to the 
inherent biases from self-evaluation, however, the OECD found that only 43 of the positive actions 
were ‘sufficient’. 
But even if there was policy change it is very difficult to identify whether this change was causally 
related to the OECD’s pressure.  Moreover, has there been  that  much  policy change in practice? 
Other  quantitative indicators of  institutions show little signs  of ‘convergence’.  On average there 
have actually been increases in the generosity of unemployment benefits (as indicated by replacement 
rates) and benefit duration in the OECD as a whole over time (see Nickell, 2003). Figure 1 shows 
that the benefit duration measure  for European countries ( where the OECD made such a large 
number of recommendations)  has drifted upwards, with no sign of any reduction in the variance of 
the measure. By contrast there has been some drop in the mean value of employment protection 
and of union density.  Another area where there has been some consistent movement is in the 
strictness of unemployment benefit entitlement – many OECD countries have moved to enforce 
the “work search” requirement more tightly over the last 20 years.  
Microeconomic studies of particular policies have suggested that, within the whole reform ‘package’ 
(active labour market policies, simplification in welfare payments, tighter eligibility conditions and 
employment-contingent payments), some policies are more effective than others.  Training measures 
for the unemployed have been rather ineffective (Heckman  et al, 1999), but reforms to benefit 
administration seem to have had more impact. A combination of job search assistance plus strict 
monitoring and sanctions does appear to be effective in improving employment chances in a variety 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
5  This is hotly contested by, for example, Baker et al, (2004) and Schmitt and Wadsworth (2002).     9 
of countries and experimental settings
6. We now turn to a more detailed examination of one  such 
policy: the UK New Deal. 
Figure 1: Benefit Duration: Mean and heterogeneity in EU countries 
 
Source:  Raw data taken from Nickell et al (2002) and amended by Baker et al (2004). The benefit duration ratio is 
an index between zero and unity (calculated as a weighted average of the ratio of the average benefit level 
during the second, third and fourth year of unemployment to the average benefit level during the first year 
of unemployment). The line is the (unweighted) mean across European countries. 
 
3.1  Unemployment Policy in the United Kingdom: Example of the New Deal 
The UK government  introduced a range of “New Deal” programmes for lone parents, the young 
unemployed, for older workers, and for the disabled. Participants in each of these programmes are 
assigned a Personal Advisor, who  provides assistance with  job search. There have been 
several evaluations of the New Deal for Young People (NDYP)  using different non -experimental 
methods.  For example, Blundell et al (2004) evaluate the combined impact of job search assistance 
and the wage subsidy using  identification from area and from age. They compared patterns of 
                                                   
6 Representative studies include Johnson and Kleppinger (1994), Ashenfelter et al (1999), Meyer (1995), Black et al (2003) 
on the US; Van den Berg and Van d er Klaauw (2001), Abbring  et al (1997), Van den Berg et al (1998) on the 

























































































































Spain  10 
employment within  the pilot areas (where the New Deal was introduced earlier) to non-pilot areas 
and also used the fact that 25 year olds were ineligible whereas 24 year olds were eligible for the 
treatment. Both comparison groups revealed a significant positive effect of the New Deal on 
employment of a similar order of magnitude (the chances of finding a job were raised by about 
20%), although there is some evidence that the impact was strongest in the first quarter. 
The increase in employment created by the job search/wage subsidy element of the New Deal is 
positive, but modest  - most studies put the number of jobs created year to be under 20,000. 
Nevertheless, the benefits are likely to outweigh the costs as individuals who did not get a job would 
have continued to receive Job Seekers Allowance in any case (see Riley and Young, 2001; Van 
Reenen, 2004).  
The reasons for the success of the NDYP  relate to the combination of  sanctions-enforced 
mandatory participation , job search assistance, and the possibility of wage subsidies for those who 
have difficulty in finding unsubsidised jobs. This is consistent with US microeconometric evidence.
7 
What is less clear is the impact of the other New Deal options (i.e. training and government jobs). 
This element of active labour market policies has come in for increased critical scrutiny. Although 
unemployment is reduced whilst people are on these schemes, their overall employment chances are 
often not improved by such interventions (Calmfors, Forslund and Helmstrom, 2002). 
3.2  A summing up: unemployment policies 
There has been a consensus among a number of international bodies, including the  International 
Monetary Fund and, less overtly, the OECD, that the adoption of ‘flexible’ US-style labour market 
institutions would be the cure of unemployment in Europe.  The model of policy transfer implied by 
our analysis of these policies lie somewhere along the spectrum between ‘rational’ (voluntary) policy 
transfer and social coercion – the latter element  illustrated by the use of scorecards and other  target 
indicators to flag up ‘problem’ economies.  Given this particular form of policy transfer, it is perhaps 
not surprising that  there  has been little clear convergence in the policies that have ultimately been 
adopted – for example those on unemployment benefit level or durations.  In contrast, there does 
seem to have been  a general move towards stronger job search assistance and enforcing the work 
search  through  monitoring,  sanctions and job subsidies. The results from the  evaluation literature 
give some support  for this evolving focus on job search a ssistance, monitoring and enforcement.  
Such policies have sometimes been combined with other elements of active labour market policy 
(ALMP)  such as education, training and government support. The evaluation literature gives less 
                                                   
7 See Blundell et al (2003, 2003, 2004) for surveys of the experimental evaluations of Welfare to Work, Katz (1998) on 
wage subsidies and Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001).   11 
support for ALMP-style policies, but it may be that offering such policies is part of the political 
trade off needed to obtain buy-in for reforms from organised labour. In response to the 
unemployment shock of the 1980s, for example, both Denmark and the Netherlands introduced 
tough work search requirements, but did so in the context of generous levels of unemployment 
benefit. Such generosity was less necessary in the UK, because unions had been weakened. 
4  An emerging consensus on in-work benefits? 
Making Work Pay (MWP) programmes – that is, programmes that improve in-work benefits relative 
to out-of-work benefits  – reflect the other side of the coin to unemployment policies.  Increasing 
the incentives to enter work should complement policies designed to tackle unemployment and non-
participation. The experience of MWP programmes accords more closely with the policy transfer 
model that sees transfer as the voluntary diffusion of successful policies,  suitably adjusted for local 
conditions and amended in the light of perceived limitations of existing ‘versions’ of the policy.  A 
number of countries (Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States) 
have relatively long experiences of employment-conditional payments as part of their systems of 
welfare support. A number of other countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Holland, Denmark) have 
recently adopted similar policies of subsidising low-paid workers’ wages as a way of improving work 
incentives, and others (Australia) are actively considering whether to adopt MWP policies as part of 
their respective programmes of welfare reform.  To illustrate these aspects, we consider the degree 
to which such programmes can generate positive employment effects, the specific design features of 
an MWP policy that either help or hinder in that regard, and the extent to which the experience of 
existing MWP programs have actively informed new policy developments. 
4.1  MWP policy evaluation  
Much of the evidence on the employment and labour supply effects of MWP programs centres on 
the experience of the UK and US. This is natural, given the long history of MWP programs in these 
two countries compared with others in the OECD.  It is  worth emphasising how much the 
behavioural effects of MWP policies are conditioned by the design features specific to the US 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the UK Working Tax Credit (WTC). In both cases, the tax 
credit is assessed on family incomes. The UK tax credit system combines with an individual-based 
tax system, while the US EITC operates within a family-based tax system. Both tax credits have 
increased substantially over the last two decades, providing an opportunity both for ex-ante and ex-  12 
post  evaluation
8. Most programs implemented or proposed elsewhere in the OECD are relatively 
recent innovations, and can therefore only be assessed on an ex-ante basis.  
Most evaluation studies of the effects of the US EITC suggest that expansions in EITC entitlement 
have  promoted employment  among (principally female) single-headed households.  For example, 
Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999) estimate  that around two-thirds of the increase in  employment rates 
among single-parent households  between 1984 and 1996  could be attributed to the expansion in 
EITC entitlement over the same period. Similarly, Ellwood (2000) suggests  that around 30% of the 
increase in employment among female-headed families over recent years can be attributed to EITC 
expansion. And in a widely cited study, Eissa and Liebman (1996)  estimate  that the 1986 EITC 
expansion led to an increase of between 2.8  and 6 percentage points  in labour force participation 
rates of single parents.  
In contrast, many evaluation studies that explore the employment effects of EITC expansion among 
two-adult households report  more  ambiguous employment responses.  For example,  Eissa and 
Hoynes (1998) estimate that the EITC expansions of 1993 and 1996 generated a combined increase 
of around 0.2 percentage points in employment  among males in two-adult households with children, 
but a decrease in employment among women of up to 1.2 percentage points.  Whilst apparently 
counter-intuitive, these negative  responses  among secondary earners in two-adult households 
(principally women) derive from the fact that EITC entitlement is assessed on family income, so that 
any  reduction in  employment  among  secondary earners  actually  increases the family’s EITC 
entitlement.  
Similar effects have been uncovered in the United Kingdom. Empirical studies of the effects of the 
move from Family Credit to the Working Families' Tax Credit (WFTC) in the late 1990s estimated a 
net increase in employment ranging from between 10,000 to 100,000 people (Blundell, Duncan, 
McCrae and Meghir, 2000). However, this net figure combines an increase of around 2.2 percentage 
points in the employment rate among single-headed households with a  reduction  of around 0.5 
percentage points in the employment rate among women in couples. And evaluation studies  of the 
Earnings Supplement Programme and the Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) suggest that after a year on 
SSP, ‘program group members were twice as likely as control group members to be working full 
time’ (Card et al.  2000).  
                                                   
8  Ex ante evaluation methods principally involve the (micro)simulation of the effects of policy reform using structural 
models of economic behaviour. There are a  number of related ex post evaluation methods (e.g. matching estimators, 
difference-in-difference and natural experiment techniques). For a survey of the former, see Creedy and Duncan (2002), 
and for the latter, see Blundell and Costa Dias (2002). 
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4.2  MWP policy convergence? 
In charting the evolution of Making Work Pay policies across Australasia, Europe and the United 
States, it is interesting to consider whether or not a consensus is emerging in the design of welfare 
programs. It is certainly true that established MWP policies in the United States and the United 
Kingdom have evolved in a fashion that has arguably brought policy design features in these two 
countries closer together  (Duncan and Greenaway, 2004; Walker, 1999). In fact, reforms to the 
United States’ EITC and the United Kingdom’s Working Tax Credit policies have provided much of 
the ex post evaluation evidence on which subsequent policy initiatives (in Europe, in particular) have 
been based. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that new policy initiatives around the world are not 
simple clones of existing MWP policy structures in the US or the UK. This is in part due to different 
national institutions and policy settings, creating different initial conditions for the introduction of 
MWP policy. Moreover,  ex post evaluations, whilst informative, can never translate as an entirely 
accurate picture of the effects of similar MWP policies in different countries.  The existence of 
heterogeneous treatment effects across national boundaries itself creates scope for variation in 
policy, and places a limit on the degree of policy transfer that can reliably take place.  
Table 1 provides a summary of the main features of MWP programs currently in existence, ordered 
by the year of introduction of the first employment-contingent scheme in each country.  For 
example, the first employment-conditional benefit in the United Kingdom (Family Income 
Supplement, FIS) was first introduced in 1971. Later reforms ultimately led to the UK’s current 
MWP program (the Working Tax Credit) being introduced in 2003.  Looking carefully at Table 1, we 
do see some form of consensus emerging, but not precisely towards either the UK or the US model. 
The new M WP policy models are typically delivered as tax credits rather than through benefits 
agencies. They are relatively modest in terms of generosity, and generally assessed against individual 
rather than family incomes. All are phased in with earned income, and none include a specific hours 
contingency for entitlement. This apparent convergence  in MWP policy does seem to represent a 
classic  case study in policy transfer, since a number of the lessons drawn from the  implementation 
of existing MWP policies (many of which stem directly from evaluation studies)  appear to  have 
influenced the design of new programs. 
Among the major issues of interest to countries framing new MWP policy are t he employment 
effects and cost effectiveness of MWP policies.  The evaluation evidence on the employment effects 
of MWP policies suggests an uneven impact across demographic groups, something that has been of 
major concern to European countries (such as Denmark and France) that have recently introduced 
new MWP programs. Results from evaluations of MWP programs in the UK and US persistently 
show that second earners  in two-worker households typically have a reduced incentive to work,   14 
principally because MWP payments are assessed on family income in both policy models. Of course, 
moving to a system of individual assessment raises distributional concerns regarding  the family 
income of those receiving tax credit support. Moving to a system of joint taxation raises similar 
concerns regarding the incentives such a system creates for single- relative to two-earner households. 
The fact that most new policies are assessed on individual income indicates a degree of concern with 
this aspect of longer-standing MWP policies.  Indeed, the  recent welfare reform debate in Australia 
on the potential role of employment-conditional payments  in  the  new tax system reinforces this 
point most convincingly: 
“There is considerable research available on the potential impact of schemes such as the EITC. 
Firstly, they can make a significant difference in encouraging income support recipients into work. 
This is especially the case for lone parents in the United States. Their impact on couples with children 
is less positive. Although they induce some people to move from income support to work, they also 
reduce workforce participation by some second earners in a family as assistance is withdrawn a t 
higher income levels. In the Australian context, it would be critical to integrate any such tax credit […] 
to ensure that the expected positive work incentive effects flowing from the [new tax] package were 
not compromised.” 
                                  Reference Group on Welfare Reform (2000), p44 
 
When judged narrowly in terms of their effectiveness in promoting employment, most evidence on 
the cost-effectiveness of MWP policies suggests that  they  are relatively expensive. This would raise 
obvious concerns if this were the sole criterion by which to judge such programs. However, MWP 
programs also serve a distributional purpose, to provide financial support to specific groups of low-
income working families (perhaps those with young children, as was the case in the UK under 
WFTC, and as is the case under the differentiated rate structure of EITC in the US). The extent to 
which the provision of income support to families already in work  should be regarded as 
“deadweight”, rather than redistribution, is therefore a question that can only be answered in the 
context of the objectives that have informed the structure of the MWP policy. 
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Table 1. The evolution of 'Making Work Pay' policies 
Country  Current programme  Year of 
introduction1 
Agency responsible for 
payment 
Unit of assessment  Maximum 
entitlement  
Conditions of entitlement 










UK  Working Tax Credit (WTC)  1971  Benefits agency (1971-1999) 
Tax administration (1999-) 
Families  6150+  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
US  Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) 
1975  Tax administration  Families  4000  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Canada   Canadian Child Tax Benefit 
(CCTB) 
1978  Tax administration  Families  3150  Yes  Yes  No   
Ireland  Family Income Supplement 
(FIS) 
1984  Benefits agency  Families  2260+  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
New Zealand  Family Tax Credit (FTC)  1986  Tax administration  Families  750  No  Yes  Yes  No 
Finland  Earned Income Tax Credit  1996  Tax administration   Individual  290  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Belgium  Income Tax Credit  2001  Tax administration  Individual  500  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
France  Prime pour l'emploi (PPE)  2001  Tax administration  Individual  630  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Netherlands  Employment Tax Credit  2001  Tax administration  Individual  920  Yes  No  No  No 
Denmark  Earned Income Tax Credit  2003  Tax administration  Individual    Yes  No  No  No 
Sources : Gradus and Jusling (2001); Pearson and Scarpetta (2000); Duncan and Greenaway (2004).  
Notes:   1 ‘Year of introduction’ refers to the first instance of the MWP policy in the country concerned, and not the date of introduction of the current programme . 
 
   16 
5  Retirement saving and labour market participation  
Reforms to public pensions and retirement saving policies  are particularly  high on the agenda in 
many developed countries as a result of  fiscal  pressures  arising  from population ageing.  The 
fundamental equation of population ageing – that future generations of retirees will need to work 
for longer, consume less whilst working, or consume less whilst retired – means that the nature of 
the policy debate is far-reaching and broad. But reforms to  pension  systems targeted at encouraging 
longer working lives (or, more usually, removing disincentives for shorter working lives) can be seen 
as an employment policy for older workers that  complements the  earlier analysis  in  this paper. 
Indeed, the OECD analysis of the problem of inactivity of older people (for example, Blöndal and 
Scarpetta, 1998) mirrors many of the priorities of the Jobs Study analysis described in Section 3 – 
lower effective taxes on  older workers, and the  dismantling of institutional policies such as  the 
subsidisation of  early retirement,  the  relaxation of  conditions governing  access to disability 
insurance, and the imposition of retirement tests and other penalties attached to work in later life.  
Given these common themes, has there been any degree of convergence of such retirement policies 
that reflects a process of policy transfer? In this section we begin by examining such retirement and 
late-life  employment  dimensions of pension  policies, before going on to consider pension and 
retirement saving programmes more generally. 
The most common  areas for reform of pension systems  are to the normal retirement age and the 
link between contributions and benefits, but others include early and late retirement options, the 
indexation of benefits, the inheritance of pension rights on widowhood or divorce, and the 
integration between public pension income and other types of retirement incomes.
  Some  broad 
commonalities in policy reform have  certainly emerged across countries. These include a general 
tendency to reduce the generosity of indexation of benefits in retirement and a distinct movement to 
raise the ‘normal’ age of receipt of public pension benefits (as illustrated in Figure 2).
9  
                                                   
9 Although most cross-country studies, such as Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998), suggest that actual replacement rates in 
public pension programmes have generally been increasing over the last thirty years. 
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Figure 2: Reforms to age of eligibility for state retirement benefits  around the world 

















  Source: Duval (2003) 
At a superficial level, the commonality of policy trends provides evidence of policy transfer.  But 
what is the nature of the policy transfer in this case?  A  striking feature of retirement income 
programmes is that retirement income provision is very heterogeneous across countries. To analyse 
the ‘mechanics’ of retirement, we need to understand the nature of this heterogeneity  even if, in 
aggregate, apparently similar retirement patterns emerge.  As an example, consider the  labour market 
activity of older workers in the UK - Figure 3 shows the economic activity status of men aged from 
50 to 69.   It shows clearly that employment rates are already low for men in their early sixties  [as 
they are, in  differing degrees, in many other OECD countries  – see Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998) 
and Gruber and Wise (1999) for many similar illustrations].  But Figure 2 also shows that those out 
of the paid labour market at these ages are divided fairly evenly into tho se who are retired and those 
who are inactive on long term sick or disability benefits. Banks and Casanova (2003), using data 
from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, show that this split is systematic by wealth, 
particularly amongst those aged 50-59. More specifically, they show a U-shaped pattern of labour 
market inactivity across the wealth distribution, with high wealth groups having high rates of early 
retirement, low wealth groups having high rates of inactivity, and only the middle wealth groups 
having high rates of economic activity.  This distribution in large part arises from the combination in   18 
the UK of a substantial private pension sector and a relatively generous public disability income 
programme; institutional features that are not replicated in many other OECD countries. 
Figure 3: Economic activity rates of men, 55-69, in the UK 
Source: Banks, Blundell, Disney and Emmerson (2002), calculat ed from 2001 Family Resources Survey 
 
Similar patterns  of inactivity  rates  are observed in other  countries with markedly different 
institutional arrangements in their public pension systems , but not necessarily the U-shaped pattern 
of retirement rates across individuals with different incomes.  Gruber and Wise (1999), for example, 
show that although the pattern of exits may be similar, the programmes that inactive individuals 
move onto differ considerably across countries.  A similar phenomenon emerges if one looks at 
income replacement across countries — even in cases where the level of income replaced on labour 
market exit at older ages is similar, the composition of income (in the sense of the relative 
importance of unemployment, disability or early retirement programmes for example) may differ 
substantially (see Disney and Whitehouse, 2001). 
Of course, pension and retirement programmes have many other dimensions  than simply  their 
propensity to create  late-life employment incentives, and as we begin to look at these dimensions 
further, the full diversity of policy  arrangements and policy reform begins to emerge.  It is  certainly 
hard to look at the direction of reform in this area and see a single model or design emerging, 
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a systemic move towards more ‘actuarial fairness’ in public pension programmes, as implemented in 
varying degrees in Germany, Italy and Sweden (Disney, 2000b, Casey et al, 2003). 
The  sense in which programmes  are converging is that the broad direction of reform across 
countries has been to make pension programmes less generous to future cohorts, where generosity 
is typically measured by forecast spending as a per cent of GDP, by the age of eligibility for benefits, 
or by future predicted replacement rate for a ‘typical’ earner. Such ‘convergence’ is unsurprising, 
however, given that  the fiscal stresses caused by population ageing mean that most governments 
face similar intertemporal budget constraints.  As some of the sceptics in the political science 
literature ask about policy transfer: are we really observing policy transfer or simply seeing common 
problems that are resolved in heterogeneous ways by local polities
10?   
True convergence in social security, pension and retirement saving programmes may be too much to 
expect at this point in time, for at least three types of reasons. First, even if a preferred model for 
social security were to emerge, demographic and labour market conditions are very different 
internationally and, as a result, the effects of moving to new systems (both in terms of the long run 
benefits and the transition costs associated with the reform), given initial conditions, are both large 
and variable across countries. The number and types of winners and losers from the same reform in 
two different countries could differ substantially, and this will depend on much more than just 
current labour market states (as it would with unemployment and in-work benefit policies). Second, 
an explicitly dynamic welfare policy such as social security requires a stance to be taken on intra- and 
inter-cohort redistribution and it is clear from existing structures and reform that different countries 
will choose different equity-efficiency trade offs. This will affect both the relative weight attached to 
cohorts of gainers and losers in transition, and quite possibly the overall perceived long run benefits 
of reform altogether. Third and finally, pension reforms take an entire working life before their full 
effects can be evaluated. As a result the experimental evaluation methods that have informed the 
design of unemployment and in-work benefit programmes discussed in previous sections are not 
available to policy makers in this area.  
Even in the absence of explicit policy transfer or convergence on pensions there is a very real sense 
in which the nature of the policy debate itself has become increasingly international. International 
empirical evidence is being collected and specific policy reforms and experiments are being carefully 
watched by analysts and policy makers around the world — the wholesale privatisation of social 
                                                   
10  And even such convergence in generosity is not uncontroversial, since inferring generosity across the whole 
distribution from such simple summary statistics (often coupled with forecasts of future governments’ 
commitments) raises its own methodological and analytical problems.   20 
security systems in Latin America and the move to a notional defined contribution based system in 
Sweden  and other countries  being notable examples. In addition to other empirical methods, 
econometric models identified through international variation in policy (measured at the 
microeconomic level) are being used to understand the behavioural process for wealth accumulation 
and retirement choices. Coupled with this, internationally comparable longitudinal data on the 
income, employment, wealth, health and pensions of older people is becoming available for the US, 
UK and Europe. Such data will create an enhanced evidence base on which the more sophisticated 
behavioural models necessary for informed policy analysis in this area can be estimated.   
6  Summary and conclusions 
We began this paper by asking what economists can add to the debate on public policy transfer, a 
debate that has hitherto been more the domain of political scientists who have focused on the policy 
transfer process, and the institutional environment within which such transfer takes place. In 
providing answers to this question, we explored three domains of public policy; unemployment 
programmes; in-work benefit and tax credit programmes; and policies to assist with retirement 
saving. By way of a general answer to the question posed, economic science has been able to bring 
methods of policy evaluation and policy determination (either separately or in combination) to 
understand both the policy process and the policy outcome, and thereby assist in the process of 
policy formation. Economists have provided methods of judging theories of diffusion and spread of 
‘best’ or ‘better’ practice. And economists have been able to assist directly in the process of policy 
learning and adaptation through careful evaluation studies of particular ex post policy experiments or 
ex ante policy ideas, as evidenced by the evolution of MWP programmes over the last decade.   
However, our case studies serve to highlight  different aspects of the policy transfer literature or, at 
least, different policy models.  We argued that MWP policies in many ways conform to the classic 
‘rational’ policy transfer model in which policies are based on diffusion of evidence from early 
implementers, with  adjustment to local conditions and also to limitations in existing policy 
uncovered by policy evaluation.  In contrast, unemployment policies can be placed further along the 
‘rational’-‘coercive’ spectrum of policy transfers, with strong elements of social coercion ( principally 
through the OECD's use of scorecards and indicators) but with incomplete policy  implementation. 
It is also evident that unemployment policy trends (for example, in the generosity of unemployment 
insurance programmes) are quite inconsistent with the  OECD's  prescribed policy model. We have 
shown that  ex post policy evaluations of  different  components  of the  policy ‘package’  serve to 
discriminate between those  elements  that appear to work and those that do not.  It is less clear   21 
whether these evaluations have led to a reorientation of the overall  unemployment policy  package 
towards the elements of the policy package that are apparently more successful. 
The case study of reforms to retirement income programmes is somewhat harder to reconcile with 
the policy transfer ‘paradigm’.  At first sight, many countries have followed  similar strategies, such as 
raising the retirement age, in response to demographic ageing and programme cost considerations.  
But these apparent  similarities conceal great institutional differences in demography and labour 
market conditions across countries, and differences in  the effects of retirement  policies across  the 
distribution of households within each country. Despite influential studies of global ageing such as 
that of the World Bank (1994), these common policies are driven by common problems, rather than 
by international transfer either of the policy agenda or the policy solution. This is evidenced by the 
variety of reforms to pension programmes that are actually being adopted in practice (for example, 
very different views exist on whether ‘privatisation’ of pension  programmes is a feasible option).  In 
a sense, this illustration  (that commonality of outcomes need not reflect the existence of policy 
transfer as such) mirrors a debate that has recently taken place in the political science literature as to 
what constitutes evidence of ‘policy transfer’ (James and Lodge, 2003).   
In general, however, whilst there may not always be evidence of policy convergence, policy design is 
increasingly being informed by international experiences. With the internationalisation of the policy 
debate, the widening and deepening of the empirical evidence base, and the recent methodological 
advances in policy evaluation techniques, measurement of policy outcomes should improve.   This 
should enhance policy transfer where it is appropriate and, as this process continues, differences in 
policy stance across countries will be increasingly interpreted as revealing differences in political, 
social and economic preferences as opposed to accidents of design or history. 
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